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I
It is commonly assumed that the quest for foreign exchange, including among
other methods excessive tariffs, import quotas, embargoes, preferences, subsidies,
licenses, exchange controls, clearing agreement, currency depreciation, multiple cur-
rency, barter deals and discriminations of all kinds,1 and similar methods of crip-
pling international trade, were the voluntary means by which certain countries
gained advantage over others,2 resulting ultimately in an artificial channeling of
international trade and stagnation on a wide scale. It is not sufficiently observed
that the unwise arrangements of the Treaty of Versailles in keeping down the sub-
sistence level of certain countries while promoting that of others, had much to do
with the difficulties created for trade in the period between the two wars. Indeed,
a strong argument could be made to show that the support of such a phenomenon
as Hider by the German people was itself a product of that despair in which Central
Europe found itself.
It is now proposed to lift the barriers to international trade by injecting into the
blood stream a large amount of American funds through UNRRA, the Bank for
Development and Reconstruction and the Monetary Fund of the Bretton Woods
agreements, loans from the Export-Import Bank, whose lending power has been
greatly increased, and similar "loans" and devices. At the same time the powers that
be have planted in the system such a treaty as is contemplated by the Potsdam
Declaration, which under the guise of reparations eradicates the distinction between
private and public property, reintroduces the element of slave labor, amputates ter-
ritory, compels migrations, and eliminates Germany' as an industrial competitor.
The same dispensation is contemplated for Japan.
Students of international relations look with trepidation upon this artificial de-
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structiog of economic values. The question remains whether that destruction can
be compensated by the loans made on American credit by the American taxpayer and
whether any more hopeful prospect is to be found in present conditions than pre-
vailed after the so-called first World War. Although the writer disclaims any
authority to speak as an economist, experience indicates that the restoration of inter-
national trade, which implies the lifting of tariff barriers and other artificial and
unilateral national methods, must operate coordinately and not disparately. In other
words, if there is any serious intention to restore international trade, the attempt
must be made on all fronts at approximately the same time. Otherwise, the effort
becomes contradictory and is likely to fail. That is to say, it is insufficient to lend
money which merely postpones the day of reckoning without effecting a funda-
mental cure in the conditions which brought about the disease involved.
Unless the peace treaties look to some recuperation of entire continents and
particularly of great industrial areas, no amount of artificial aid can breathe life into
a weakened system. UNO itself, based upon a theory that force can be used by
certain powers to make peace prevail, is handicapped by the fact that incentives are
furnished to the disinherited to resent the settlements made by the peace arrange-
ments. In other words, the lifting of international trade barriers must be attacked
on all fronts in a constructive way, and simultaneously, and not be handicapped by
the fact that political arrangements make necessary the continuation of trade bar-
riers. Under such circumstances loans become a stopgap only. Not only are they
likely to be lost irrevocably, but the disease will be as acute after the loans are ex-
hausted as it was before they were made.
Some reference has been made to the peace treaties. Perhaps the writer can
explain his meaning by the fact that peace treaties in the nineteenth and earlier cen-
turies looked to a different object from the treaties now made. Indeed, one could say
that the art of peace-making has become a lost art. In the nineteenth and earlier
centuries the object of a treaty was rarely to eliminate the unsuccessful adversary,
but while attempting to cure some of the evils which led to the war, to win back
that adversary to the western system as soon as possible, leaving him with his means
of livelihood and binding up the wounds of war as quickly as possible. The twen-
tieth century, on the other hand, has seen two world wars in which passions were
aroused beyond anything heretofore known. The result was that the object of the
war became the subjugation of the enemy, so that he could never thereafter become
a menace to the victorious powers. This has led to the destruction of industrial values
and annihilation by bombardment from the air in a fashion unprecedented. It left
in its train resentments and frustration which are hardly conducive to the hope that
the spirit of peace can be restored to the hearts of men either in the countries of the
vanquished or in the countries of the victors.
Besides, we have for the first time in 1945-6 an important power which believes
it finds advantage in the destruction of its competitors. There is, therefore, no uni-
versal desire to reconstruct the devastated regions, but on the contrary an assumed
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profit in the continued destruction of large areas. In the nineteenth century the eco-
nomic system was accepted as valid, whereas today it is challenged by many countries
under the leadership of Russia. This is a condition hardly conducive to the lifting
of trade barriers. In addition, it may be observed that the docile condition of
colonies can no longer be counted upon to maintain a fragile status quo. Asia is in
revolt against its European masters and will probably throw off the yoke before the
century is out. This creates new nationalisms which are hardly conducive to a
dropping of trade barriers. Each country, as it reaches the stage of nationalism,
seems likely to seek survival and the cultivation of the means deemed necessary to
that end.
We must, moreover, note another phenomenon which affects the prospects of
lifting trade barriers. There has been a peculiar silence on the subversion of law
during two world wars in which no large power remained a neutral so as to keep
the belligerents within legal restraint. Grotius observed this deterioration in 1625
during the Thirty Years' War.4 Belligerents in 1940 found it to their advantage,
so they thought, to conduct the war on an unlimited scale without regard to the
restraints exercised by law. As to each other the struggle reached so high a degree
of lawlessness that not even the fear of reprisals restrained the belligerents in more
than a minor degree. The writer leaves out of account completely the invention of
the atom bomb with all its implications.
The theory of united force against an "aggressor," even if it is not seen on a
wide scale, puts the fear of strangulation in every small country. The larger powers,
the coercers themselves, are likely to maintain heavy armaments in order to fulfill
their assumed duties as well as to protect themselves against each other. We are
thus likely to conclude that Milton was right in suggesting that war breeds war,
and far from witnessing that process of disarmament which should follow the
elimination of a dangerous rival, we are witnessing a competition in armaments on
a scale never before known. The abolition of neutrality alone eliminates the voice
of law and reason in holding the belligerents within legal restraint and the assump-
tion that a universal orgy will produce peace seems a contradiction in terms. Thus,
by promoting force to a pinnacle never heretofore reached, the voice of law has
become ever more silent. Were it not for the fact that the peaceful relations of states
will continue from time to time to prevail and that they must conduct their relations
according to a code many hundreds of years old, we might be led to the conclusion
that international law itself has given way to force. There should be no doubt on
the question that the force which is to constitute the governing rationale of inter-
national conduct hereafter will be used by the great powers, if at all, to perpetuate
" Said Grotius: "Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war,
such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes,
or no cause at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for law,
divine or human; it is as if, in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for
the committing of all crimes." GROTIus, DE JuRE BELLI AC PAClS (1625) proleg. 28, CLASSICS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, No. 3, Vol. 2 (F. W. Kelsey, transl., London, 1925), p. 20.
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their will and not the objective rule of law, which by inference no longer exists.
Force used by nations has always heretofore been identified as war. Can it reason-
ably be supposed that they will now use that force in the objective interests of peace?
II
To make the subject concrete, the writer will deal with only one aspect of the
economic problem facing the world. Rules of law that prevail in international law
have been largely developed because of their economic foundation and because the
interests of trade predominate over the interests of unrestrained force. If trade is to
be developed on a large scale, foreign investments and foreign private property must
have the protection of law. Otherwise, no foreign investments are likely to be made,
at least from private sources. The confiscation of private property because of con-
flict between nation and nation, is one of the most serious inroads upon the institu-
tion of private property that could well be imagined. As long ago as the eighteenth
century, when trade was still conducted in sailing ships and had not reached its
present proportions, Alexander Hamilton wrote two of his Camillus Letters in de-
fense of Article io of the Jay Treaty of 1794. His argument against confiscation
was so conclusive and classic that, while often repeated, it can truly be said that it
has not been improved upon by others. He remarked:"
"The right of holding or having property in a country always implies a duty on the
part of its government to protect that property, and to secure to the owner the full enjoy-
ment of it. Whenever, therefore, a government grants permission to foreigners to acquire
property within its territories, or to bring and deposit it there, it ,tacitly promises
protection and security....
"The property of a foreigner placed in another country, by permission of its laws, may
justly be regarded as a deposit, of which the society is the trustee. How can it be recon-
ciled with the idea of a trust, to take the property from its owner, when he has personally
given no cause for the deprivation? ...
"There is no parity between the case of the persons and goods of enemies found in
our country and that of the persons and goods of enemies found elsewhere. In the former
there is a reliance upon our hospitality and justice; there is an express or implied safe
conduct; the individuals and their property are in the custody of our faith; they have no
power to resist our will; they can lawfully make no defence against our violence; they
are deemed to owe a temporary allegiance; and for endeavoring resistance would be pun-
ished as criminals, a character inconsistent with that of an enemy. To make them a prey
is, therefore, to infringe every rule of generosity and equity; it is to add cowardice to
treachery....
"Moreover, the property of the foreigner within our country may be regarded as
having paid a valuable consideration for its protection and exemption from forfeiture;
that which is brought in commonly enriches the revenue by a duty of entry. All that is
within our territory, whether acquired there or brought there, is liable to contributions to
the treasury, in common with other similar property. Does there not result an obligation
to protect that which contributes to the expense of its protection? Will justice sanction,
G 5 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Lodge's ed. 1885-6) 414, 415, 46-48. See the extended
quotations from Hamilton and the references to the treaties concluded by the United States in JonN
BAssrrr MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND SOME CURRENT ILLUSIONS (1924) 14 et seq.
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upon the breaking out of a war, the confiscation of a property, which, during peace, serves
to augment the resources and nourish the prosperity of a state?"
In his Camillus Letter XVIII, Mr. Hamilton stated :6
"No powers of language at my command can express the abhorrence I feel at the idea
of violating the property of individuals, which, in an authorized intercourse, in time of
peace, has been confided to the faith of our Government and laws, on account of con-
troversies between nation and nation. In my view, every moral and every political senti-
ment unite to consign it to execration."
Some inroad upon the institution of private property was adumbrated in Article
297 of the Treaty of Versailles. But that Article gave the nations only an option
to confiscate of which some, unfortunately, took advantage. As the writer under-
stands the Potsdam Declaration, it confers no option but purports to make the con-
fiscation of private property in the enemy country and in the home country of the
victor obligatory. Not only this, but the victors have imposed the obligation of
surrendering private property upon the neutrals under threat of such sanctions, e.g.,
blacklists and "freezing" of assets, as they could impose on neutrals. If they are
successful in this quest it will indicate that the neutrals no longer are sovereign
states but mere appendages of the belligerent powers and function without regard
to law under domination of the Great Powers.
The rule that private property is immune from confiscation is established not
only in modern international law,7 and in the annex to Article IV of the Hague
Convention, but is the product of a long historical process which realized that trade
and confiscation were incompatible. Down to the eighteenth century confiscations
occasionally occurred, but it was realized that trade could not go on under this dis-
pensation. As early as 1215 Magna Charta had perceived that foreign merchants
must be given protection for their property on a basis of reciprocity, in the event
of the outbreak of war. While this principle was not easy to adopt it became a more
or less established practice after the Reformation and the origin of the state system
in 1648. Napoleon was one of the last to use confiscation, although he did it spar-
ingly. The nineteenth century had become completely convinced of the economic
importance of preserving private property against all contingencies, even war. Such
a rule stimulated the making of foreign investments, direct and indirect.
During the last war there were some sacrificial sales made by the Alien Property
Custodian and some effort was made to destroy the values in his possession. With
0 5 WoRms oF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Lodge's ed. 1885-6) pp. 405-406.
'Borchard, Enemy Private Property (1924) A8 Am. J. INT. L. 523.
s Article 4 read: "All Merchants shall have safety and security in coming into England, and going
out of England, and in staying and in traveling through Engand, as well by land as by water, to buy
and sell, without any unjust exactions, according to ancient and right customs, excepting in the time
of war, and if they be of a country at war against us: and if such are found in our land at the begin-
ning of a war, they shall be apprehended without injury of their bodies and goods, until it be known
to us, or to our Chief Justiciary, how the Merchants of our country are treated who are found in the
country at war against us; and if ours be in safety there, the others shall be in safety in our land." BoD
C. BARRINGToN, MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS oF ENGLAND (1900) 239-240.
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reference to the confiscatory policy thus subtly reflected, John Bassett Moore has
remarked:
"In the original statute the function of the alien property custodian was defined as
that of a trustee. Subsequently, however, there came a special revelation, marvelously
brilliant but perhaps not divinely inspired, of the staggering discovery that the foreign
traders and manufacturers whose property had been taken over had made their invest-
ments in the United States not from ordinary motives of profit but in pursuance of a
hostile design, so stealthily pursued that it had never before been detected or even sus-
pected, but so deadly in its effects that the American traders and manufacturers were even-
tually to be engulfed in their own homes and the alien plotters left in grinning possession
of the ground. Under the spell engendered by this agitating apparition, and its patriotic
call to a retributive but profitable war on the malefactors' property, substantial departures
were made from the principle of trusteeship ....
"The subject has also another aspect. During the past ten years the investments
abroad by citizens of the United States have enormously increased, and the process has
only begun. Considering the question, therefore, purely as one of selfish calculation, I
venture to think it directly contrary to the interests of the United States to resuscitate the
doctrine that enemy private property found in a country on the outbreak of war may be
confiscated. Such a doctrine might even create a temptation.
"But there is yet another and higher reason. The United States has an honorable past
as well as an expedient future to consider.
"Of all the illusions a people can cherish, the most extravagant and illogical is the
supposition that, along with the progressive degradation of its standards of conduct, there
is to go a progressive increase in respect for law and morality. Again may we remark
that 'there is no new thing under the sun.' The world never will be rid of the problem
of preserving its elementary virtues. Three hundred years ago Grotius declared that, as
he who violated the laws of his country for the sake of some present advantage to himself,
'sapped the foundation of his own perpetual interest, and at the same time that of his
posterity,' so the people that 'violated the laws of nature and nations' broke down 'the
bulwarks of its future happiness and tranquillity."
"No less pertinent is the confession of Alexander Hamilton, made a century-and-a-
quarter ago, that, serious as the evil of war had appeared to him to be, yet the manner
in which it might be carried on was in his eyes 'still more formidable.' It was, said
Hamilton, 'to be feared that, in the fermentation of certain wild opinions, those wise,
just, and temperate maxims, which will forever constitute the true security and felicity
of a state, would be overruled,' and that, one violation of justice succeeding another,
measures would be adopted which even might 'aggravate and embitter the ordinary calam-
ities of foreign war.'
Yet in this war we find that standards of public morality have so far been re-
duced that the Alien Property Custodian has authored a bill' empowering the
United States to confiscate the private property of Germans, Japanese, and possibly
Italians in the Custodian's possession. A hearing on this bill was held April 17,
1946.
' MOORE, op. ci. supra note 5, at 22, 24-25; 6 COLLECrED PAPERS OF JoHN BASSETr MOORE (1945)
27, 28-29.
"S. 1322, 79th Cong., ist Ses. (945): "A Bill to amend the Trading with the Enemy Act, as
amended, and for other purposes."
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As against this confiscatory policy of the Alien Property Custodian, we may print
two extracts from recent Secretaries of State. Said Secretary Hughes in his address
at Philadelphia November 23, 1923:11
"A confiscatory policy strikes not only at the interest of particular individuals but at
the foundations of international intercourse, for it is only on the basis of the security of
property, validly possessed under the laws existing at the time of its acquisition, that the
conduct of activities in helpful cooperation, is possible. . . . Rights acquired under its
laws by citizens of another State, [a State] is under an international obligation appropri-
ately to recognize. It is the policy of the United States to support these fundamental
principles."
As recently as May 27, 1935, Secretary Hull stated in a letter to Senator Capper :12
"Such action would not be in keeping with international practice and would undoubt-
edly subject this Government to severe criticism. Moreover, the confiscation of these
private funds by this Government and their distribution to American nationals would
react against the property interests (some very large) of American nationals in other
countries. It would be an incentive to other governments to hold American private prop-
erty to satisfy claims of their nationals against this Government and to pass upon such
claims in their own way. It is important from my point of view, therefore, that the
United States should not depart in any degree from its traditional attitude with respect
to the sanctity of private property within our territory whether such property belongs to
nationals of former enemy powers or to those of friendly powers. A departure from that
policy and the taking over of such property, except for a public purpose and coupled
with the assumption of liability to make just compensation, would be fraught with dis-
astrous results."
If the conception is now to prevail that war is to be levied upon non-combatants,
the so-called total war which excuses all lawlessness, the human race will have de-
teriorated beyond redemption. We shall find its first evidence in the fact that for-
eign investments will be made with great reluctance. And rarely will this be done
by private bankers, who will not risk a long-term loan on such a precarious political
position as now faces the world accompanied by the rule that confiscation is the
penalty of belligerency. Possibly it is for that reason that we already find that such
loans as are made are made from country to country, with all their political implica-
tions and at the expense of the taxpayer. The whole economic system is disrupted
at the source by discouraging foreign investment. That was one of the main rea-
sons for the rule of immunity of private property. With the breaking of that rule
the result is not likely to remain outstanding.
It seems, therefore, unwise to expect the lifting of trade barriers on a wide scale
and on any permanent footing so long as we make the underlying conditions diffi-
cult for trade. One of these conditions is the free flow of capital from country to
country, and if the system of private enterprise has any validity whatever, from
private reserves. The rule of confiscation invalidates at the source any hope for
'z Borchard, o7. cit. supra note 7, at 531.
l'Borchard, Confiscations. Extraterritorial and Domestic (1937) 21 Am. J. INT. L. 68o.
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foreign private investment, and for that reason seems likely to frustrate our larger
aims.
This survey will have indicated that the lifting of trade barriers is associated with
the lifting of all the other restrictions upon international trade, including the polit-
ical, and that unless these measures have a constructive orientation, the result is
likely to be one-sided, and eventually unsuccessful. To deal successfully with the
subject, therefore, requires a re-examination of the methods used in recent years to
safeguard private property.
III
From the table printed below" the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce
of the Department of Commerce calculated that in September, 1944, this country
had abroad in direct investment $7.3 billions, and in indirect investments some $4
billions. This was not, however, adequate to offset the foregin investments in the
United States which, direct and indirect, amounted to some $12 billions, leaving on
total balance a deficit of $1.2 billions. In other words, by reason of the extraordinary
amount of Lend-Lease expenditures, very little of which will be repaid, the expend-
iture of dollars abroad through our armed forces and the refugee capital which
sought refuge in this country from the European holocaust, the United States, at
least temporarily, has become a debtor nation again. That, however, is only an
incident of the larger question of whether it seems likely that the American investor
abroad will feel justified in making direct and indirect investments hereafter. From
what has been said it will be concluded that the political risks attending a foreign
investment are now so great that the national investor is likely to hesitate to make
a foreign investment, direct or indirect.
Some of these political handicaps warrant examination. Reference has already
been made to the risk he runs of the confiscation of his property in the event this
country goes to war, unfortunately an ever present possibility in the light of our new
policy of intervention. We have observed the economic warfare which handicapped
the trader during the x93o's. The need of ending such warfare is recognized on
every hand. Yet that warfare received impetus in the economic policies during and
"8 International Investment Position of the United States (in Billions of Dollars):
U. S. Investment Abroad: Foreign Investment in U. S.:
Dec. Sept. Dec. Sept.
1939 1944 1939 1944
Long-term investments: Long-term investments:
Direct 7.0 7.3 Direct 2.0 2.2
Foreign dollar bonds 3.8" 1.7" Pfd. and common stocks
Miscellaneous private n.r. 1.0 Corporate and gov't bonds .7
U. S. Government n.r. .6 MIiscellaneous 4.3 .6
Total long-term 10.8 10.6 Total long-term 6.3 6.2
Short-term: Short-term:
Private 0.3 Private 2.8
Official .6 .2 Official 3.3 3.3
Total short-term .6 .5 Total U. S. liabilities 9.6 12.3
Total U. S. assets abroad 11.4 11.1 Net Investment Position:
Valued at par. On long-term account +4.5 +4.4
Market value. On short-term account -2.7 -5.6
n.r. Not reported. Net position +1.8 -1.2
See Tremaine, U. S. Now a Debtor Nation-The Amazing Reversal in Our International Investment
Position (1945) 75 MAG. OF WALL ST. 78, 79-
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following the war of 1914, and has been perpetuated in the doctrine of sanctions
which is common to both Article i6 of the Treaty of Versailles and to the United
Nations Organization. That warfare disclosed extraordinary ingenuity in devising
trade barriers of all kinds which placed the foreign trader at the mercy of govern-
ment policy. This unfair competition finally ended in full war, international and
revolutionary. It is a misfortune that the danger of economic warfare seems to be
continued in the principles of the Potsdam Declaration, not to speak of the threats
inherent in the San Francisco Charter.
And here we find that inconsistency to which attention has already been called.
While exerting enormous efforts to lift from the world those shackles on interna-
tional commerce which the 193o's developed in such profusion, political arrange-
ments are made which tend to stifle these efforts. To be sure, the political
arrangements are not immutable, but no trade can advance without the restoration
of a reasonable measure of confidence among the warring nations, a realization that
the peoples of all nations must be allowed to eat and to live under conditions com-
mensurate with their social advancement, a determination to suppress the instincts
of vengeance and to avoid confusing retribution against governments with retribu-
tion against private citizens, an appreciation that economic nationalism, promoted
rather than retarded by the treaties of i919, is out of harmony with current neces-
sities for wider regional exchanges, a dissipation of the fear of political extinction
or enslavement by the device of "enforcing" peace by some nations upon others.
Merely to mention some of these underlying political necessities of an economic
peace will indicate the magnitude of the problems facing the post-war world.
More than trade itself, foreign investment is dependent on stable political condi-
tions and the reign of law. Even in these hectic times people must eat and work
if they can, so that some exchange of food and raw materials for the products of
industry is bound to continue in the face of all handicaps. Not so with foreign
investment and the migration of capital, which at the first sign of maltreatment is
likely to dry up. And yet large areas of the world are unable to create out of their
own resources that surplus wealth which would make dependence on foreign capital
unnecessary. Particularly is this true of agricultural countries beginning an indus-
trial development. It was true of the United States during the nineteenth century,
when many American railroads and industries were largely dependent upon Euro-
pean capital. Europe and Asia, since the war, hardly present inviting quarters for
foreign investment. The nineteenth century, admittedly one of the most remark-
able of all, had in many ways a better comprehension of the needs of the human
being and of intelligent ways to meet those needs than the twentieth century seems
to display. It wius then realized that since the free flow of capital was indispensable
to the exploration and exploitation of undeveloped areas, political and legal condi-
tions must be created which, while naturally giving no assurance against economic
risks, would nevertheless afford some security against political destruction. And if
local law proved only an ostensible and not a real protection against arbitrariness,
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discrimination and denial of justice, international law came to the investor's aid to
assure him a measure of due process of law. Under such conditions the countries
where capital accumulated and the countries that needed this capital both profited
by the stability which brought the investment and the resulting trade.
Governments at first took but little interest in the enterprise and made justifiable
distinctions between contractual and economic risks taken with open eyes or neces-
sarily incurred, and exceptional tortious or political risks against which the citizen
could justifiably ask protection both locally and internationally. Even in such mat-
ters as indirect or portfolio foreign investments, of which American citizens own
about $4 billions, the custom has been not to interpose against unavoidable defaults,
of which Americans have been the victims on a large scale, but to protect and sup-
port the bondholders against bad faith, diversity of security or pledges, arbitrary
repudiation or rank discrimination.
Direct Investments Abroad by American Citizens. In the matter of direct invest-
ments, the force of circumstances and enterprise has made American citizens the
owners of about $7 billions worth in foreign countries, distributed among industries
fostering communication and transportation, manufacturing, mining, agriculture and
miscellaneous enterprises. About two-thirds of the total, as is the case with portfolio
securities, is invested in the Western Hemisphere, much in Canada but most in
Latin America. What Latin-American countries do is therefore of great importance
to the whole institution of foreign investment and the major problems have arisen
in that quarter.
So widespread and common was the pre-war habit of having nationals or national
capital abroad, that a great body of law has grown up around the practice, determin-
ing the legal relation between the foreign element and the local government on the
one hand, and the foreign element and its own government on the other hand.
Finally, international law has established by precedent the relation between the two
governments arising out of this investment. Without undertaking to analyze this
complex of legal relations, it may be said that the alien is in principle subject to the
local law and has no cause for international complaint unless he is discriminated
against, unless the advantages of the local law are denied him, unless he is the vic-
tim of an outrage, initiated or supported by the local government. The interna-
tional law has something to say to control the divagations and illegalities of local
law or administration-but only in these exceptional cases of arbitrariness, however
disguised, which expose the foreigner to discriminatory or intentional mistreatment.
The practice is now so definitely controlled by law that the Latin-American nations
have little, if anything, to fear from its application by arbitral tribunals or Foreign
Offices; if there have been in the nineteenth century occasions when forceful inter-
vention has made them perform obligations against their wills, the shoe is now
distinctly on the other foot. Too many of them desire the advantages of foreign
capital, without assuming corresponding responsibilities.
Legal Implications of Non-Intervention Policy. There is at the moment an in-
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tellectual controversy between a small Latin group that maintains that Secretary
Hull, in signing treaties at Montevideo and Buenos Aires providing for non-
intervention by one country in the affairs of another on this continent, and provid-
ing that the foreigner may never claim better treatment than the national, has aban-
doned the right of diplomatic interposition on behalf of injured American citizens.
This answer was made by Mexico in contesting the American notes of 1938, protest-
ing against the confiscation of agricultural lands by giving the owners practically
worthless bonds and later only a receipt. Secretary Hull's reply was that the treaty
of Montevideo did not expose foreigners to the risk of arbitrary mistreatment, what-
ever nationals might have to suffer. The confiscation was settled by a compromise
payment by Mexico extending over a period of years, without admitting, however,
that any international wrong had been committed. This matter may come back to
plague us.1
4
Nationalization Movement in Latin America. We have witnessed in recent
years the effort of certain Latin-American countries to take over large foreign-owned
properties on one excuse or another, as an alleged penalty for failure to observe the
local law, for alleged defect of title, for alleged breach of contract, for alleged superi-
ority of the public need. Unless such expropriations are closely- controlled and
checked by the utmost good faith, they are likely to lead to complete loss of confi-
dence, the withdrawal where possible of foreign investments, and political conse-
quences of an unpleasant character. It is a nice and often difficult question to
determine how far retroactive laws challenging vested rights can be sustained in
international law. But when the country of the investor finds itself unwilling for
political reasons to insist upon the rule of law, and thus condones a local disrespect
for the rights of foreigners, this conflict between politics and law necessarily im-
pairs the security of foreign investment. If private investment is thus discouraged
and public funds are sought from or advanced by a foreign country, the borrower
may be inviting what in time may become a new imperialism. The local state is in
no danger from private capital; the acceptance of foreign government capital may
have political effects.' 5
It is not necessary now to examine the local obligations which the foreign in-
vestor incurs. At one time it was thought that the combination of foreign cap-
"' Cf. Freeman, Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the Challenge to International Law (946)
4o Am. J. INT. L. x25.
" The last paragraph of the minority report on the bill to increase the lending authority of the
Export-Import Bank, SEN. REP. 2005, 7 6th Cong., 3rd Sess. (Aug. 6, 1940) reads as follows:
"6. We wish to make clear that we approve Secretary Hull's sincere and effective policy of promoting
friendship with South American countries, a united military front, and a united opposition to totalitarian
government, but we say that the lending of money to those countries is not an essential part of that
policy or an advisable part of that policy. We say that it is futile, wasteful, and unwise; that it will
seriously injure and not assist, the producers of South America and the farmers of North America. If
the only way we can maintain a good-neighbor policy is by lending our neighbors money, then the
whole structure is based on sand and will be washed away the moment the loans stop. We know as
individuals that the poorest way to make a man a good neighbor is to lend him money. It is far more
likely to make him your enemy for life. The same result has come in the past from international loans
and is bound to come in the future."
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
ital and technical skill with local labor, exploiting natural resources or industry,
brought an advantage to the country, which it usually recognized by law and by
contract. Now, in these new days, there seems to be an impression that the foreigner
must go beyond the law or his contract and supply public welfare institutions for
the workers or for the local population which the state may fail to provide. As a
matter of fact, large-scale enterprises have been philanthropic and far-sighted and
have voluntarily undertaken to promote the social welfare and medical care of their
employees and their families, and build even public works, often beyond the require-
ments of the labor law or their contract. But if it should come to be the practice that
foreigners must submit to ever increasing burdens and impositions limited only by
local political discretion, then foreign investment will become a snare and a trap for
the unwary. Economic nationalism in Latin America has already made foreign
investment in many respects precarious; if continued, those countries may kill the
goose that laid the golden egg and expose themselves to new forms of political
imperialism.
Apart from tax discriminations, now largely alleviated by local law or by treaty,
the most subtle ways of making the owner of a direct foreign investment uncom-
fortable is to compel him to comply with the local labor laws under penalty of
expropriation. These labor laws are allegedly designed to promote the interests of
the working man, and at the same time to cut down the privileges of foreign capital.
They therefore meet with considerable approval at home, but since only large com-
panies can run the risk, they are likely either to dry up foreign investment or to shut
off the flow of foreign capital. Under the guise of labor laws, foreign enterprises
are obliged to take over a large part of the social welfare obligations which normally
fall upon the state. In general they must train natives to operate the industries, and
afford the local working man a large measure of recreation, medical care for families
and other obligations designed to afford the working man a high standard of living.
Since only the few can bear these burdens, private foreign investment is likely to
drift into the hands of large corporations, who alone can bear the risk. If the for-
eign corporation finds the conditions intolerable, it is tempted to withdraw its invest-
ment. This may be done for it by expropriation or inhospitality so great that it
voluntarily withdraws or refrains from further investment. In Mexico, in the case
of the oil properties, the local law was largely set aside to accomplish an industrial
expropriation which fortunately for Mexico acquired the advantage of the European
war to prevent open foreign intervention or arbitration. The local country can
thus gain immense profits out of hand, but it is questionable how far such methods
nullify that confidence which is necessary to obtain capital. There is some reason
to believe that Mexico regrets the expropriation it undertook some ten years ago.
If other countries are minded to follow Mexico's example, they are likely to encoun-
ter open intervention from foreign countries. Foreign capital is easy to frighten off
by arbitrary action.
Calvo Clause. Partly in order to avoid foreign intervention, the countries of
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Latin America have by contract, statute, constitution, and treaty adopted a provision
by which resort must be had to the local courts and diplomatic intervention fore-
sworn, as a condition of doing local business. While this first applied only to rev-
olutionary damages, designed to avoid discrimination in favor of the foreigner, it has
been extended to all business relations. Most Foreign Offices probably take the view
that the clause merely incorporates international law into the transaction and does
not foreclose diplomatic interposition in the event of a denial of justice. The cases
are almost equally divided. But the signature of the clause induced the Mexican
arbitral tribunal in the North American Dredging Company case and in the Mex-
ican Union Railway case, to conclude that the clause had some value in that the
signatory corporation must at least try to avail itself of local remedies as the condition
of an international claim, even though the protocol of agreement excludes the neces-
sity of resort to local remedies as a normal condition of an international claim.
Whether the South American countries have gained much by insistence upon the
clause is a debatable question.
The devices employed to make foreign capital uncomfortable must, in the inter-
ests of local industry, not be carried to excess; otherwise, private investment is likely
to cease. It cannot afford to run the political risks which capital-hungry countries
are likely to place upon it.

